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Introduced	 to	 Korea	 around	 1900,	 the	 modern	 idea	 of	 the	 ethno-nation	 (minjok)	
developed	into	one	of	the	most	important	intellectual	and	political	concepts	circulating	
in	 the	 country	by	 the	early	1920s.	 From	 the	nationalists’	 viewpoint,	 the	ethno-nation,	




Otto	 Bauer’s	 and	 Joseph	 Stalin’s	 understandings	 of	 nation	 as	 a	 product	 of	 capitalist	
modernity—started	 to	 question	 the	 nationalistic	 approach	 to	 Korean	 identity	 as	 a	
matter	 of	 principle	 by	 the	 late	 1920s	 and	 early	 1930s.	 There	 was	 no	 full	 agreement	
among	 them	on	 how	 to	 understand	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Korean	 ethno-nation.	 Some	of	
them	believed	that	the	Korean	ethnic	core	dated	back	to	the	age	of	the	Three	Kingdoms	
(the	 first	 century	 BC	 to	 AD	 668).	 Others	 put	 heavier	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 proto-
capitalism	and	markets	 in	 the	modern	development	of	national	consciousness,	 tracing	
this	development	 to	 the	 seventeenth	or	eighteenth	 centuries.	 This	 article	 summarizes	
these	debates—between	nationalists	and	Marxists,	and	also	within	the	Marxist	milieu—
and	links	them	to	Marxist	intellectual	developments	elsewhere.	The	author	argues	that	
the	 “proto-constructivist”	 approach	 articulated	 by	 some	 colonial-age	Marxists	was	 an	
important	counterweight	to	the	nationalist	nativism	of	the	1920s	and	1930s	and,	in	the	














colonial	Korea	 (1910–1945).1	 The	main	protagonists	 in	 the	debates	were,	on	one	side,	
Marxists	(some	of	them	related	to	the	underground	communist	movement)	and,	on	the	
other	 side,	 more	 conventional	 nationalists.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 former	 were	
attempting	 to	 articulate	 an	 understanding	 of	 nation	 that	 can	 be	 termed	 “proto-
constructivist.”2	 The	 latter,	 as	 I	 attempt	 to	 make	 clear	 in	 this	 article,	 were	 further	
developing	the	minjok	discourses	of	the	last	precolonial	decade	(1900–1909),	to	which	a	
set	of	qualities	ascribed	to	the	ethno-nation	(“national	character”)	was	central.	For	the	
nationalists—in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Marxists	 and	 their	 emphasis	 on	 the	 dialectics	 of	
production	 force	 development	 and	 class	 struggle—“nation”	 constituted	 the	
fundamental,	primeval	essence	of	Korea’s	time-honored	history.	At	the	same	time,	the	






Minjok	 is,	without	 doubt,	 one	 of	 the	 central	 concepts	 of	 Korean	modernity.	 For	 both	
Koreas,	 North	 and	 South,	 the	 concept	 is	 of	 crucial	 ideological	 importance	 today.	
Whereas	South	Korea	officially	adopted	multiculturalism	as	state	doctrine	at	the	start	of	




claim	 to	 eventual	 unification	 with	 North	 Korea.3	 In	 the	 case	 of	 North	 Korea,	 the	
discursive	status	of	minjok	appears	to	be	significantly	higher.	Much	less	integrated	into	
the	capitalist	world	system	and	influenced	by	the	international	migration	trends	of	late	
capitalism	to	an	 incomparably	 lesser	degree,	North	Korea	bases	much	of	 its	 legitimacy	
on	 its	claim	to	 the	role	of	guardian	of	Korean	ethno-cultural	values	against	 imperialist	
predations	(Shin	2006,	89–93).		
Concurrently,	minjok	is	crucially	important	to	the	relationship	between	the	two	
Korean	 states	 and	 the	 worldwide	 Korean	 diasporas	 currently	 totaling	 approximately	
seven	million	people,	or	10	percent	of	the	Korean	peninsula’s	population,	according	to	
South	 Korea’s	 statistical	 authorities	 (Kukka	 chip’yo	 ch’egye	 2016).	 The	 relationship	
between	these	diasporas	and	the	two	Koreas	are	complicated	and	potentially	conflict-
ridden.	 In	 South	 Korea’s	 case,	 Chinese	 Koreans	 (chaoxianzu,	 ethnic	 Korean	 citizens	 of	












popularly	 known	 as	 Koryŏ	 Saram),	 for	 example,	 may	 justifiably	 resent	 being	 placed	
below	Korean	Americans	 in	 the	 official	 and	 unofficial	 hierarchies	 of	 South	 Korean	 life	
(Seol	and	Skrentny	2009,	151–153).	Still,	minjok	provides	a	special	ground	for	relations	
between	them	and	the	South	Korean	state	and	society,	which	non-ethnic	Korean	foreign	
workers	 lack	 (Lee	 2010,	 185–233).	 By	 law,	 overseas	 ethnic	 Koreans	 are	 allowed	







It	 is	 noteworthy,	 however,	 how	 relatively	 recent	 the	 concept	 of	minjok	 is,	 and	 how	
historically	quick	was	its	ascendance	to	a	central	position	in	Korea’s	nascent	system	of	
modern	discursive	coordinates	during	the	early	twentieth	century.	As	research	by	South	
Korean	scholar	Kwŏn	Podŭrae	 (2007)	demonstrates,	 the	Meiji	 Japanese	word	minzoku	
(K.	minjok,	Ch.	minzu)4	first	entered	the	Korean	language	in	1898,	when	Chang	Hoik	(?–
1904),	then	a	Korean	student	in	Japan,	mentioned	the	term	in	an	article	on	Spenserian	
societal	 competition	 in	 a	 journal	 published	 by	 Tokyo-based	 Korean	 students.	 Inside	
Korea	 proper,	 the	 first	 known	 usage	 occurred	 in	 1900	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 editor	 of	
Hwangsŏng	sinmun	(Capital	gazette),	a	mouthpiece	of	reformist	Confucians.	The	letter	
used	minjok	 as	 a	 translationof	 “race”	 and	 discussed	 the	 vicissitudes	 in	 the	 history	 of	
“White	minjok,”	or	“Eastern	minjok.”5		
Minjok	 first	 appears	 in	 Hwangsŏng	 sinmun	 articles	 in	 1903,	 in	 an	 article	
describing	 the	 pro-war	 views	 of	 a	 prominent	 Japanese	 businessman,	 Viscount	
Shibusawa	 Eiichi.6	 As	 noted	 in	 Kwŏn	 (2007,	 48–55),	 already	 in	 1905–1906,	 Korean	
periodicals	routinely	used	the	word	minjok	as	a	reference	to	both	Koreans	as	a	historical	
ethnonational	 group	 and	 Koreans	 as	 a	 political	 nation—that	 is,	 the	 subjects	 of	 the	
Korean	Empire	(1897–1910).	Ethno-nation	as	a	concept	was	being	quickly	entrenched	in	
a	 country	 threatened	 with	 foreign	 colonization	 (and	 ultimately	 annexed	 by	 Japan	 in	
1910):	 the	 concept	 was	 to	 provide	 the	 sort	 of	 cohesion	 that	 the	 weakened	 Korean	
Empire,	a	Japanese	protectorate	since	1905,	could	no	longer	build	among	its	subjects.	
From	 1905	 to	 1910,	minjok	 had	 several	 important	 connotations	 in	 its	 Korean	
usage.	On	the	one	hand,	it	was	understood	as	an	extended	lineage	of	sorts,	shaped	by	
the	 supposed	 four	 thousand	 years	 of	 history	 since	 the	 times	 of	 Korea’s	 legendary	

















differences	 between	 “ethno-nation”	 (minjok)	 and	 “political	 nation”	 (kungmin),	 made	
this	potential	clear.	Ethno-nation	was	understood	to	be	constituted	by	homogeneity	of	
blood	lineage	(hyŏlt’ong),	territory,	history,	religion,	and	language.	However,	to	develop	
into	 a	 political	 nation,	 the	 ethno-nation	 needed,	 in	 addition,	 the	 unity	 of	 “spirit”	
(chŏngsin),	especially	in	relationship	with	the	outer	world,	as	well	as	the	consciousness	








On	 the	other	hand,	minjok	 could	 also	mean	 simply	 the	 “people”	 as	 an	ethno-
political	subject.	Importantly,	as	a	political	category,	it	was	broader	than	kungmin,	as	it	
also	 included	 women	 and	 adolescents,	 who	 were	 so	 far	 not	 supposed	 to	 claim	 full	
membership	in	the	nation	as	a	political	construction.	They	were,	however,	also	exhorted	
to	 be	 aware	 of	 their	 role	 as	 the	 country’s	 preservers	 and	 excel	 in	 competition	 with	
foreigners,	so	as	to	guarantee	Korea’s	survival	in	the	age	of	Darwinian	struggles.9	While	
an	 essentialized	 cultural	 and	 historical	 category	 built	 upon	 a	 fusion	 of	 the	 imported	
concept	of	ethnonational	volk10	and	the	indigenous	focus	on	descent	groups	as	the	basic	
units	 of	 a	 society,	minjok	was	 simultaneously	 denoting	 citizenship	 and	 civic	 duties,	 as	

























Under	 Japanese	 colonial	 rule,	 Korean	 ethnicity	 became	 a	 legal	 category.	 Korea	 was	
classified	as	gaichi	(outlying	territory);	ethnic	Koreans	were	gaichi	residents	required	by	
the	 1915	 law	 on	 civil-status	 registration	 (Chōsen	 minsekihō)	 to	 enter	 the	 gaichi	
household	 register.	By	 contrast,	ethnic	 Japanese,	 including	 these	 living	 in	Korea,	were	
enrolled	 in	 the	 Japanese	civil-status	 register	 (according	 to	 the	1899	Nationality	Law	of	
Japan).	Ethnic	Koreans	and	ethnic	 Japanese	were	subjected	to	 the	two	divergent	 legal	
systems.	 The	 former	were	 governed	both	by	 common	 Japanese	 laws	and	 the	 colonial	
Governor-General’s	 decrees,	 which	 were	 in	 many	 cases	 applied	 to	 Koreans	 only;	 the	
latter	 enjoyed	 at	 least	 some	 protections	 allowed	 by	 the	 1889	 Meiji	 Constitution.	
Koreans	 were	 severely	 disadvantaged	 under	 the	 colonial	 discrimination	 regime;	 they	
could	not	even	travel	to	Japan,	the	colonial	metropole,	without	a	special	permit	(Chen	
1984;	M.	Kim	2012,	181–189).		
As	 “ethnic	 Korean”	 was	 synonymous	 with	 “colonized”	 and	 “discriminated	
against,”	minjok	 could	not	but	become	a	 term	for	anticolonial	 subversion,	 for	 the	Left	
and	 Right	 alike.	 It	 was	 the	 central	 ideological	 code	 for	 March	 First,	 the	 large-scale	
independence	movement	that	began	in	Korea	on	March	1,	1919—when	Wilsonian	“self-
determination”	 was	 demanded	 by	 demonstrators	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Korean	 ethno-
nation	 (Pak	 C.	 2010,	 91–93).	 Ironically	 enough,	 it	 was	 the	 system	 of	 colonial	
discrimination	that	made	minjok,	a	relatively	novel	term	in	the	Korean	vocabulary,	into	a	
word	 of	 daily	 usage,	with	millions	 of	 demonstrators	 proclaiming	minjok	 rights	 on	 the	
streets	during	the	days	of	the	March	First	Movement	(Chŏng,	Yi,	and	Yi	1989).	
Deprived	of	civil	rights	and	put	under	a	strict	censorship	regime	(Han	2016),	the	
colonial-era	 nationalist	 intellectuals	 were	 adding	 further	 details	 to	 the	 essentialized	
images	 of	 minjok’s	 past	 and	 its	 current	 status,	 the	 blueprints	 for	 which,	 as	 I	 have	
mentioned,	were	found	in	the	last	precolonial	decade.	Nationalists	typically	saw	minjok	
as	an	extended	family-like,	age-old,	and	very	homogenous	(or	homogenized)	entity,	with	
its	own	“consciousness,”	 “spirit,”	 “character,”	and	“special	 features.”	However,	 in	 line	
with	 the	 general	 tendency	 toward	 an	 analytical	 approach	 to	 reality—	 inspired	 by	 the	
social	 sciences	 and	 strongly	 influenced,	 inter	 alia,	 by	 the	 surge	 in	 popularity	 of	 leftist	
discourses	 in	 the	 1920s—the	 new	 views	 of	minjok	 placed	 stronger	 emphasis	 on	 its	
historicity	 rather	 than	 on	 its	 pseudofamilial	 qualities.	 A	 good	 example	 of	 such	 a	
definition	 is	 a	 programmatic	 editorial	 in	 Tong-a	 ilbo	 (East	 Asian	 daily),	 	 “Discussing	
Korea’s	 Ethnonational	 Movement	 at	 the	 Beginning	 of	 the	 Worldwide	
Reformation,”which	defined	minjok	as	a	“product	of	history”	but	in	the	same	time	as	an	
“ever-flowing,	 continuous	 totality	 [chŏnch’e].”11	 Even	 if	 it	 was	 history	 that	 formed	
minjok,	 the	 time	 of	 its	 historical	 existence—assumed	 to	 amount	 to	 four	 thousand	









entity.	 In	 addition	 to	 being	 a	 community	 of	 common	 fate,	 minjok	 was	 also	 a	




Nationalist	 ideologists	 regarded	 not	 only	 individuals,	 but	 nation-states,	 too,	 as	 being	
defined	 by	 their	 ethnic	 composition,	 and	 Tong-a	 ilbo’s	 1920	 editorial	 assumed	 that	 a	
“homogeneous	 nation”	 (tan’il	 minjok)	 in	 each	 and	 every	 nation-state	 was	 to	 be	 the	
standard	 of	 modern	 international	 society.	 However,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	
“homogeneity”	here	referred	to	the	common	character	and	culture	grounded	in	shared	
historical	 experiences,	 rather	 than	 the	 assumption	 of	 an	 identical	 bloodline.	 The	
editorial	 made	 a	 point	 of	 saying	 that	 “infusions	 of	 Chinese	 or	 Japanese	 blood”	 into	
Korean	 veins	 did	 not	 matter,	 as	 the	 totality	 and	 actuality	 of	 minjok	 was	 primarily	
anchored	in	its	historicity	and	communal	consciousness	(Tong-a	ilbo	1977,	1:27–28).12	In	











self-reliance”	 were	 all	 intact.14	 In	 this	 and	 other	 nationalistic	 narratives,	minjok	 was	
typically	 described	 as	 an	 individual-like	 collectivity,	 almost	 as	 a	 single	 person—with	 a	
strongly	 individual	 set	 of	 characteristics—in	 plural.	 Indeed,	 much	 of	 the	 early	
nationalistic	 scholarship	 on	 Korea’s	 history	 and	 culture	 was	 devoted	 to	 attempts	 to	




















munhaksa),	 defined	 Koreans	 as	 collective-oriented,	 polite	 and	 respectful,	 simple	 and	
warm-hearted,	 peace-loving,	 optimistic,	 and	 able	 to	 combine	 down-to-earth	
pragmatism	with	 good	Confucian	 virtues	 of	 humaneness	 and	 righteousness	 (An	 1994,	
146–185).	The	infusions	of	Han	Chinese,	Mohe	(K.	Malgal),	or	Xianbei	(K.	Sŏnbi)	blood	in	
the	 Korean	 “bloodline”	 did	 not	 really	 matter,	 as	 long	 as	 all	 Koreans	 were	 united	 in	
worshipping	 Tan’gun,	 their	 forefather	 “equal	 to	 bright	 and	 fair	 Heaven	 in	 the	 Korean	
thinking.”	 In	 other	 words,	 as	 long	 as	 beliefs	 and	 “national	 character”	 worked	 to	
consolidate	 the	minjok,	 its	 heterogeneous	descent	would	have	 little	 impact	 (An	1994,	
146–185).		
It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	 the	 “national	 character”	 as	 seen	 by	 the	
nationalist	 intellectuals	 was	 both	 a	 given	 and	 a	 variable.	 National	 character	 was	
regarded	 as	 a	 reality	 that	 one	 could	 observe	 and	 assess;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 Korean	
nationalism	as	a	movement	was	supposed	to	 improve	 it	 in	the	desirable	direction.	For	




of	 public	 commitment	 and	 cooperative	 skills.	 In	 An	 Ch’angho’s	 thinking,	 Koreans	
definitely	were	 lacking	 in	these	qualities,	but	 the	situation	could	be	 improved	through	
conscious	collective	efforts.	Yet	another	 important	exhortation	 to	 the	students	was	 to	
not	treat	less	educated	compatriots	contemptuously,	and	to	not	focus	too	much	on	the	
shortcomings	 of	 the	 Korean	 national	 character.	 The	 character	 could	 be,	 after	 all,	











Government	 (the	 exile	 government,	 organized	 by	 Korean	 nationalist	 emigrants	 in	
Shanghai	 in	 1919),	 Tongnip	 sinmun	 (The	 independent)	 reported	 that	 Yi	 Tongnyŏng	
(1869–1940),	then	Minister	of	the	Interior	in	the	provisional	government,	mentioned	in	













national	 sovereignty,	 coupled	 with	 the	 belief	 in	 self-determination	 and	 popular	
sovereignty—rather	than	the	“blood	lineage”-related	ideas—that	formed	the	backbone	
of	 the	 overseas	 Koreans’	 nonsocialist	 nationalism	 in	 the	 1910s	 through	 the	 1930s	 (R.	
Kim	 2011,	 4–14).	 As	 Pak	 Ch’ansŭng	 concludes	 in	 his	 study,	 cultural	 and	 historical	
homogeneity	took	precedence	over	speculations	about	a	“unitary	Korean	blood	lineage”	
in	 the	 Korean	 nationalist	 discourse	 of	 the	 1920s	 and	 1930s.	 Some	 nationalists,	 both	
inside	 and	 outside	 Korea,	 sometimes	 mentioned	 the	 assumed	 singular	 bloodline.	
However,	 in	 most	 cases	 it	 was	 understood	 as	 a	 complementary	 element	 in	 the	
relationship	to	the	homogeneity	of	the	beliefs,	spirit,	and	virtues.	Collectively	believing	
in	 Tan’gun’s	 role	 as	 the	 nation’s	 forefather	 was	 clearly	 more	 important	 than	 the	
bloodline	of	Tan’gun	per	se	(Pak	C.	2010,	103–106).	
One	 necessary	 caveat	 is	 that	 nationalist	 views	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 “national	
bloodline”	 were	 as	 ideologically	 and	 politically	 diverse	 as	 the	 nationalist	 milieus	
themselves.	 In	 theory,	 the	 positions	 on	 radical	 land	 reform	 or	 the	 feasibility	 of	 going	
further	 toward	a	 Soviet-type	 society	 after	 the	hoped-for	national	 liberation	 separated	
the	socialist	and	nonsocialist	nationalist	camps	on	a	general	level.	In	practice,	the	lines	
between	 them	 often	 blurred,	 and	 diverse	 groups	 and	 opinions	 coexisted	 inside	 each	
camp.17	This	diversity	is	visible,	for	example,	in	the	answers	given	by	various	nationalist	
intellectuals	 to	 a	 question	 concerning	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 interracial	 marriages,	
asked	 in	 September	 1931	 by	 the	 editors	 of	 a	 popular	 monthly,	 Samch’ŏlli	 (Three	
thousand	 li).	 All	 the	 intelligentsia	 luminaries	 who	 answered	 the	 question	made	 clear	
their	opposition	to	economically	or	politically	motivated	marriages	“with	 foreign	races	




concerns	of	 the	 leftists,	made	 it	clear	that	humanity’s	progress	was	achieved	precisely	
through	 “blood	 contact”	 between	 different	 nations	 and	 that,	 in	 his	 opinion,	 it	 was	
internationalism	that	constituted	the	dominant	trend	of	the	current	age	(Tikhonov	and	
Miller	 2008,	 1–30).	 By	 contrast,	 Hwang	 Aesidŏk	 (Esther	 Hwang,	 1892–1971),	 an	
American-educated	 female	 Christian	 and	 concomitantly	 nationalist	 activist,	 defined	
Koreans	as	possessors	of	 “superior	qualities”	and	concluded	 that	 their	marriages	with	




















category	 of	 “ethnic	 Korean-ness”	 by	 systematically	 according	 different	 juridical	
treatment	to	Koreans	and	Japanese	on	the	Korean	peninsula,	Korean	nationalists	of	the	
colonial	 era,	 building	 further	 on	 the	 conceptual	 developments	 of	 the	 last	 precolonial	




same	time	particular	and	separate	vis-à-vis	 the	rest	of	 the	world.	All	Koreans,	 just	 like	
one	person,	possessed	a	special	set	of	traits,	virtues,	and	characteristics,	and	all	had	to	







Marxism	 took	 its	 shape	 after	 the	 democratic	 and	 national	 revolutions	 of	 1848	 and,	
naturally	enough,	had	to	engage	from	the	very	beginning	with	the	issues	of	nation	and	
nationalism.	 In	 the	 beginning,	 Marxist	 understanding	 of	 the	 dialectic	 of	 national	
identities	 and	 movements	 was	 rather	 instrumental	 (Glenn	 1997).	 Such	 Marxism	




was	 regarded	 as	 an	 important	 prerequisite	 for	 internationalist	 working-class	
cooperation—hence	the	attention	to	the	“Polish	question”	(Marx	and	Engels	1953,	116–
120).	 The	 point	 about	 the	 essentiality	 of	 support	 for	 national(ist)	 demands	 for	
independence—naturally,	only	as	long	as	such	a	demand,	voiced	against	an	oppressive	
multiethnic	empire,	 is	 “progressive”—was	 further	developed	by	Vladimir	Lenin	 (1870–
1924).	 He	 famously	 foregrounded	 the	 right	 to	 national	 self-determination	 as	 a	
fundamental	 democratic	 principle,	 although	 it	 was	 clearly	 always	 expected	 that	 the	





Yet	 another	 commonality	 shared	 by	 Lenin,	 Engels,	 and	 other	 Marxist	







constructivist”	 position.	 Nations—Hungarian,	 Polish,	 or	what	 Lenin	 termed	 “advanced	
capitalist	 nations	 of	Western	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America”	 (Lenin	 1973,	
22:148–153)—were	 seen	 as	 products	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 history,	 most	
significantly	 as	 the	 results	 of	 the	 history	 of	 capitalist	 development	 inside	 the	
frameworks	of	absolutist	states	and	the	history	of	liberal	(“bourgeois”)	revolutions.	In	a	
classic	 Marxist	 statement	 on	 the	 problems	 of	 nation,	 Die	 Sozialdemokratie	 und	 die	
Nationalitätenfrage	 (1907),	 Otto	 Bauer	 (1881–1938),	 a	 famed	 Austrian	 Marxist	
theoretician,	 recognized	 the	 premodern	 roots	 of	 modern	 nations	 in	 the	 tribal	
“communities	 of	 nature”	 and	 medieval	 “communities	 of	 culture”;	 however,	 as	 he	
emphasized,	 it	was	 the	 capitalist	 development	of	 transportation,	 industry,	 commerce,	
postal	systems,	and	press	that	produced	the	nations	 in	the	modern	sense	of	the	word	
(Bauer	[1907]	2000,	62–63).	
Bauer	 preferred	 to	 solve	 ethnic	 issues	 with	 national-cultural	 autonomy	 for	
minorities,	which	would	both	alleviate	ethnic	discrimination	and	prevent	the	breakup	of	
large	multiethnic	 states	 by	offering	 the	minorities	 a	 practical	 alternative	 to	 secession.	
The	implementation	of	this	solution	was,	interestingly	enough,	attempted	in	the	short-
lived	 Far	 Eastern	 Republic	 (1920–1922)	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Korean,	 Jewish,	 and	 Ukrainian	
populaces	 (Sablin	 2017).	 Some	 sort	 of	 local	 Korean	 autonomy	 existed	 in	 the	 Russian	
Maritime	 Province	 even	 after	 the	 demise	 of	 the	 Far	 Eastern	 Republic—annexed	 by	
Bolshevik	Russia	in	1922—but	by	1926,	non-Bolshevik,	pan-Russian	ethnic	organization	
of	 Koreans	 was	 disestablished	 and	 further	 Korean	 immigration	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Russia	
banned	 (Sablin	 and	 Kuchinsky	 2017).	 Koreans	 were	 defined	 as	 a	 foreign	 population	









Lenin’s	 view,	 important	 traits	 of	 historical	 capitalism’s	 early	 history.	 Wherever	
capitalism	was	 still	 underdeveloped,	 the	 formation	of	modern	nations	was	 stunted	as	
well	 (Lenin	 1973,	 20:17–51).	 In	 fact,	 Bauer’s—and	 Lenin’s—accounts	 of	 the	 origins	 of	
modern	 nations	 contain	 in	 their	 nuclei	 all	 the	 essential	 theses	 of	 contemporary	
constructivist	theoreticians	of	nations	and	nationalisms,	including	the	centrality	of	“print	
capitalism”	 (Anderson	 1991)	 and	 standardized	 high	 culture,	 popularized	 through	 the	
educational	system	and	media	(Gellner	1983).	
By	 contrast,	 French	 philosopher	 and	 historian	 Ernest	 Renan,	 in	 his	 influential	
1882	 speech,	 emphasized	 modern	 European	 nations’	 presumed	 roots	 in	 post-Roman	
Germanic	barbarian	kingdoms,	as	well	as	“common	will”	and	communal	consciousness	









common	with	 the	 views	 of	 the	 Korean	 nationalists	 of	 the	 1920s	 and	 1930s	 discussed	
earlier.	 Bauer’s	 belief	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 “national	 character”—which	 he,	 however,	
considered	a	highly	variable	product	of	historical	conditions	([1907]	2000,	20–22)—was	
also	not	entirely	different	from	the	speculations	of	the	likes	of	An	Hwak	on	the	Korean	
national	psyche,	 the	difference	being	Bauer’s	 emphasis	on	 the	decisive	 importance	of	
modern,	 rather	 than	 ancient,	 history.	 However,	 Bolshevik	 thinkers	 who	 exerted	
especially	 strong	 influence	 on	 the	 Korean	 Marxists	 of	 the	 1920s	 and	 1930s—for	
example,	Joseph	Stalin	(1878–1953)	in	his	well-known	1913	pamphlet	Marxism	and	the	
National	 Question—made	 it	 clear	 that	 different	 classes	 and	 groups	 of	 which	 nations	
consist	 are	 hardly	 in	 a	 position	 to	 share	 the	 same	 “character,”	 the	 use	 of	 common	
language	 notwithstanding.	 It	 was	 the	 communality	 of	 (capitalist-age)	 economic	 life	







to	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 As	 a	 Marxist	 thinker,	 famed	 Korean	 philosopher	 and	
popular	 writer	 Sin	 Namch’ŏl	 (1903–1958)	 defined	 it,	 ethno-nation	 was	 a	 historically	
formed	human	collective,	united	by	its	shared	language,	territory,	and	economic	life,	as	
well	 as	 the	 “spiritual	 communality”	 produced	 by	 the	 experience	 of	 cultural	 unity	 (Sin	
1948,	 80).19	 Sin	 obviously	 agreed	with	 his	 non-Marxist	 contemporaries	 on	 the	 ethno-
nation’s	 historicity,	 as	well	 as	 the	 (historically	 conditioned)	 existence	 of	 some	 sort	 of	
“spiritual	 communality”	among	 fellow	nationals.	He	did	not,	however,	 regard	national	
existence	 as	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	 individual	 life,	 and	 showed	 little	 interest	 in	
speculations	on	the	ethnonational	 traits,	character,	or	virtues	of	Koreans	that	were	so	
popular	 in	 the	 nationalist	 milieus.	 He	 was	 even	 less	 interested	 in	 the	 ethno-nation’s	




about	 the	 reified,	 ahistorical	 dichotomy	 of	 East	 versus	 West.	 He	 acknowledged	 the	
difference	between	the	“West’s	human-centeredness”	and	the	“Eastern”	attachment	to	
the	ideas	of	non-action	(Ch.	wuwei;	K.	muwi)	or	cosmic	interconnectedness,	but	tended	
to	ascribe	 this	difference	 to	 the	disparity	of	 the	economic	basis	 in	 the	 capitalist	West	
and	pre-capitalist	 East,	 exactly	 in	 line	with	Marxist	orthodoxy	 (Sin	1934).	 Sin	was	also	
seriously	 troubled	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 nativist	 nostalgia	 for	 the	 ethnonational	 past	 in	 post-









circles,	 and	 saw	 a	 certain	 connection	 between	 Korean	 nationalists’	 essentialist	 and	
nativist	leanings	and	the	turn	toward	nationalist	extremism	elsewhere	(Sin	1935).	
However,	 given	 Korea’s	 sociopolitical	 situation	 in	 the	 1930s,	 simply	 defining	
ethno-nation	 in	 an	 orthodox	 Marxist	 way	 and	 subsequently	 denouncing	 nationalist	
attempts	 to	 absolutize	 or	 essentialize	 it	 would	 not	 be	 sufficient.	 After	 all,	 with	 the	
explicit	 blessing	 of	 the	 Comintern	 (Communist	 International,	 1919–1943),	 Korean	
Communists—whose	understanding	of	 the	political	 situation	 and	 the	 sequence	of	 the	
tasks	 strongly	 influenced	 nonparty	Marxists	 as	well—designated	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	
coming	revolution	as	“national	and	anti-imperialist.”	As	Korean	Communist	theoretician	
Han	 Wigŏn	 (1896–1937)	 formulated	 it	 in	 his	 programmatic	 article,	 “On	 the	 Present	
Tasks	of	the	Working-Class	Vanguard”—first	published	in	1929	in	Kyegŭp	t’ujaeng	(Class	
struggle),	a	China-based	Communist	magazine	mainly	targeting	party	members	and	their	
fellow	 travelers)—such	 a	 revolution	 had	 to	 be	 conducted	 by	 a	 proletarian-led	
collaborative	 front	 (hyŏptong	 chŏnsŏn)	 of	 different	 classes	 and	 groups	 with	 anti-
imperialist	 potential	 on	 the	 ethnonational	 (minjok)	 basis.	 Whereas	 a	 broader	 front,	
including	the	nonproletarian	“masses”	previously	 influenced	by	the	nationalist	 leaders,	
was	 seen	 as	 needed,	 Han	 viewed	 the	 political	 stance	 of	 right-wing	 nationalist	
bourgeoisie	 as	 increasingly	 reactionary	 (Han	 [1929]	 1987),	 a	 view	 that	 was	 broadly	
shared	by	the	Comintern’s	own	Korean	cadres.	A	typical	case	was	Li	Kang	(pseudonym	
for	 Yang	Myŏng,	 1902–?),	 a	 Beijing	 University	 graduate	 who	 stayed	 in	Moscow	 after	
arriving	 as	 a	 political	 immigrant	 in	 1931.	 Affiliated	 with	 the	 Comintern’s	 Communist	
University	of	 the	Toilers	of	 the	East	 (KUTV,	1921–1938),	 Li	described	Korean	“national	
reformism”	 in	 Russian	 in	 a	 lengthy	 analytical	 article	 in	 a	 small-circulation	 Comintern	
journal,	 Materialy	 po	 Natsional’no-kolonial’nym	 problemam	 (Materials	 on	 national-
colonial	 problems)	 as	 a	 reactionary	 force	 driven	 by	 unscientific	 beliefs	 in	 Koreans’	
uniqueness	and	disregarding	class	issues	(Li	[1933]	2007).	
Generally,	 the	 Comintern’s	 approach	 to	 the	 diverse	 nationalisms	 of	 the	 non-
European	 world	 was	 just	 as	 instrumental	 as	 early	 Marxists’	 views	 on	 ethnonational	
issues;	 explicitly	 anticolonial	 nationalisms	 were	 seen	 as	 potential	 allies,	 albeit	
temporarily	 (Matera	and	Kent	2017,	164),	whereas	 those	 too	 tightly	connected	 to	 the	
great	 powers,	 implicated	 in	 colonial	 enterprises,	 or	 seeking	 territorial	 expansion	were	
condemned	 as	 reactionary.	 For	 example,	 the	 Comintern	 and	 its	 affiliated	 Palestinian	
Communist	 Party	defined	 Zionism	as	 “imperialism’s	military	unit”	 destined	 to	oppress	
the	(legitimate/revolutionary)	nationalism	of	the	“Arab	masses”	on	behalf	of	British	and	
other	 colonizers	 (Programmnye	 Dokumenty	 Kommunisticheskijh	 Partiy	 Vostoka	 1934,	
294).	The	Chinese	Nationalist	Party,	the	Guomindang	was	(relatively)	“progressive”	until	
its	 anticommunist	 turn	 in	 1927,	 after	 which	 its	 nationalism	 was,	 naturally	 enough,	
redefined	 as	 reactionary	 (Mamaeva	 1999).	 Although	 Comintern	 militants	 inside	 and	
outside	Korea	viewed	 the	more	 radical	wings	of	Korean	nationalism	as	potential	allies	
until	the	late	1920s	or	early	1930s,	this	view	changed	under	the	influence	of	the	Great	
Depression.	 Since	 the	 late	 1920s,	 the	 Comintern	 espoused	 a	 (not	 fully	 substantiated)	
















Marxist	 intellectuals	 inside	 Korea	 dealing	 with	 the	 issues	 of	 nation,	 nationalism,	 and	
national	culture	or	“national	studies”	(kukhak),	which	came	in	vogue	in	the	early	1930s	
with	 the	 growing	 depoliticization	 of	 Korea’s	more	mainstream	 nationalists.	 The	 latter	
preferred	to	deal	with	the	discursive	challenges	represented	by	the	Japanese	colonialist	




as	 well—began	 giving	 serious	 consideration	 to	 socialist	 viewpoints.	 Indeed,	 a	
considerable	 amount	 of	 intellectual	 interchange	 between	 socialist	 and	 nonsocialist	
intelligentsia	was	taking	place,	especially	on	minjok-related	issues.	
An	Chaehong	 (1891–1965),	 a	 long-term	editor-in-chief	 of	Chosŏn	 ilbo,	 agreed,	
for	 example,	 that	 class	 movement	 might	 indeed	 be	 needed.	 However,	 he	 also	
maintained	 that	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 class	 struggle	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 nationally	
important,	 since	 it	would	 influence	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 nation	 as	 a	whole	 in	 the	 end	
(cited	 in	Paek	S.	2008,	110).	 Judging	 from	 the	 columns	he	published	 in	Chosŏn	 ilbo	 in	
January	1936,	he	also	appears	to	have	believed	that	Korea’s	“backward”	culture	would	
benefit	 from	the	 influences	of	“international	vanguard	culture”	 (most	 likely,	he	meant	
socialist	culture).	At	the	same	time,	he	appealed	to	respect	for	Korea’s	particularity,	in	a	
cultural	sense	but	also	in	the	evolutionary	meaning	of	the	word.	Nationalism,	a	vestige	
of	 the	 nineteenth-century	 past	 for	 established	 European	 nation-states,	 might	 be	 still	
needed	 in	 colonial	 Korea.20	 By	 1936,	 socialist	 ideas	 had	 changed	 Korea’s	 intellectual	
landscape	to	the	degree	that	even	nationalist	thinkers	felt	obliged	to	pay	homage	to	the	
ideas	of	class	struggle	and	international	solidarity.	
Still,	 nationalists’	 predilection	 toward	 foregrounding	 Koreans’	 supposed	
ethnonational	 homogeneity	 and	 particularity—rather	 than	 socioeconomic	 factors	 of	
national	 life—and	 their	 uncritical	 attitudes	 toward	 ancient	 mythology	 would	 not	 go	
unchallenged	 by	 the	 Marxists,	 with	 their	 universalist	 worldview	 and	 “scientific	
methodology.”	The	tone	of	their	criticism	was	not	very	different	from	the	ridicule	with	
which	 Li	 Kang	 cited	 An	 Chaehong’s	 musings	 on	 the	 supposed	 specificity	 of	 Koreans’	










[1933]	 2007).	 In	 a	 1935	 article	 on	 ethnic	 groups	 (chongjok)	 and	 nations	 (minjok),	 An	
Chaehong	described	Koreans—differently	from	such	composite	nations	as	the	Japanese	
or	British,	which	 formed	through	assimilation	and	conquest—as	a	single	natural	group	
made	 by	 centuries	 of	 common	 life	 under	 the	 same	 (relatively	 isolated)	 natural	
conditions	 and	 collectively	 possessing	 “virgin-like	 self-pride	 and	 emotional	 spirit	 of	
[collective]	advance”	(reprinted	in	An	1981,	546–547).	At	the	same	time,	Marxists	were	
maintaining	 that	 nations	 in	 the	 modern	 sense	 of	 the	 word	 were	 formed	 under	 the	
conditions	 of	 capitalist	 development.	 “National	 spirit”	 was	 among	 the	 terms	 they	
studiously	 avoided	 (Cho	 2015,	 77–79).	 A	 prominent	 Communist	 activist,	 Yi	 Yŏsŏng	
(1901–?)	 made	 the	 point	 clearly	 in	 his	 article	 on	 the	 national	 question	 serialized	 in	
Chosŏn	ilbo	in	November	1929:	the	transition	from	feudalism	to	capitalism	had	brought	
ethno-nations	into	modern	existence	(cited	in	Cho	2015,	78).		
Some	 Marxists,	 true	 to	 the	 spirit	 of	 dialectics,	 were	 eager	 to	 allow	 certain	
exceptionality	 to	the	Korean	case,	given	Korea’s	 long	and	relatively	continuous	history	
as	 a	 single,	 centralized	 state	with	 a	 relatively	 homogeneous	 ruling-class	 culture.	Hong	
Kimun	(1903–1992),	a	young	Communist	intellectual	who	was	to	become	one	of	North	
Korea’s	most	celebrated	experts	on	Korean	traditional	culture	after	the	1945	liberation	
(Kang	 2004),	 mentioned	 in	 his	 influential	 1934	 article	 on	 Korean	 literature	 (originally	
published	 in	Chosŏn	 ilbo)	 that	 Koreans	 had	 already	 formed	 their	 ethno-nation	 at	 the	








Korean	 literature	 in	 classical	 Chinese	 a	 part	 of	 Korean	 literary	 history,	 too.	 The	 only	
caveat	was	that	it	was	the	literature	of	the	yangban	scholar-official	class.	From	Hong’s	
viewpoint,	it	was	the	national	identity	of	the	writer	rather	than	the	linguistic	medium	of	
writing	 that	was	 to	define	 literature’s	belonging	 (Hong	 [1934]	2015).	When	 it	came	to	
issues	of	the	formation	of	ethnonational	identity	in	its	more	modern	meaning,	however,	
the	Marxists	were,	expectedly,	more	on	 the	universalist	 than	exceptionalist	 side.	Paek	
Nam’un	 (1894–1979),	 a	 prominent	Marxist	 historian	 who	 also	 went	 on	 to	 occupy	 an	
important	political	position	in	North	Korea	(Petrov	2006),	suggested	that	the	tradition	of	
“national	studies”	(kukhak)—a	form	of	self-knowledge	that	 implies	some	development	

















to	 maintain	 rigorous	 distinctions	 between	 “race”	 (injong),	 “ethnic	 group”	 (chongjok),	




Paek’s	 view,	 the	 Puyŏ	 people,	 who	 built	 the	 eponymous	 kingdom	 in	 what	 is	
northeastern	China	today	in	the	second	and	first	centuries	BC.	However,	the	Puyŏ	ended	
up	splitting	into	several	tribal	(pujok)	or	ethnic	groups	in	the	process	of	their	expansion	
onto	 the	 Korean	 peninsula,	 and	 these	 groups	 grew	 increasingly	 different	 from	 each	
other	(Paek	N.	[1933]	1989,	145).	The	same	fate	befell	the	people	of	the	Three	Han	in	
the	southern	parts	of	Korea	(first	to	third	centuries	AD),	who	were	originally	interrelated	
but	 split	 into	 three	 major	 tribal	 alliances	 in	 the	 process	 of	 territorial	 expansion	 and	
socioeconomic	development.	Then,	with	the	first	states	coming	into	being,	they	started	
to	slowly	move	toward	the	formation	of	ethno-nation	(Paek	N.	[1933]	1989,	129).	Paek	
was	 scathingly	 critical	 about	 the	 nationalist	 attempts	 to	 lump	 a	 number	 of	 ancient	
Korean	rulers	together	as	“mutually	related”	heirs	to	Tan’gun’s	state	and	“members	of	
the	clan	of	 supposed	Sun	descendants.”	Such	 idiosyncratic	 interpretations	of	past	had	
nothing	to	do	with	what	Paek	regarded	as	“the	only	scientific	method	of	research”	(Paek	
N.	 [1933]	 1989,	 145).	 As	we	 can	 see,	 Paek	 strove	 to	 give	 a	 balanced	 account	 of	both	
homogeneity	and	heterogeneity	involved	in	the	process	of	the	Korean	ethnogenesis.	His	
efforts	 contrast	 with	 the	 nationalists’	 much	 stronger	 emphasis	 on	 the	 alleged	
homogeneity	of	the	Koreans.		
As	a	professional	historian,	Paek	Nam’un	attempted	to	make	a	clear	distinction	
between	 an	 “ethnic	 group”	 (chongjok)	 and	 “ethno-nation”	 (minjok).	 However,	 some	
Marxist	polemists	who	were	not	historians	by	trade	also	sometimes	described	ancient	
proto-Koreans	 as	 an	 “ethno-nation”—at	 the	 same	 time	maintaining	 a	 distinction	 that	
they	were	 “primitive”	 (wŏnsi)	 rather	 than	 “modern”	 nations.	 Still,	 the	 thrust	 to	 apply	
“the	 only	 scientific	 method	 of	 research”	 and	 discover	 the	 general,	 universal	 logic	 of	
Korea’s	ethnohistory	was	common	to	all	Marxists	without	exception.	A	good	example	is	
a	 1935	 polemic	 by	 Kim	 Myŏngsik	 (1891–1943),	 one	 of	 the	 pioneers	 of	 the	 Korean	
socialist	movement	and	a	graduate	of	Waseda	University’s	department	of	politics	and	
economy.22	 From	 the	 beginning,	 Kim	 proclaims	 himself	 to	 be	 a	 Marxist	 evolutionist,	
believing	in	the	gradual	sophistication	of	societies	and	cultures	as	they	progress	forward	
from	 “primitive	 life”	 to	 slave-owning	 or	 feudal	 “stages”	 in	 their	 development.	 Yet	
another	starting	point	for	Kim	was	the	anthropology	of	Franz	Boas	(1858–1942),	with	its	








ethnonational	 exclusivity.	 Boas	 was	 hardly	 a	Marxist	 (Bloch	 1983,	 126–128),	 but	 Kim	
clearly	 deemed	 important	 Boasian	 anthropology’s	 broad,	 international	 view	 with	 its	
emphasis	on	the	commonalities	found	in	different	cultures.		
Arguing	 against	 the	nationalist	 penchant	 for	 glorifying	 the	 “Tan’gun	 age,”	 Kim	
Myŏngsik	 maintained	 that	 the	 primitive	 communities	 of	 the	 Korean	 peninsula	 and	
neighboring	Manchuria	simply	could	not	possess	the	cultural	splendor	ascribed	to	them	
by	 the	 nationalist	 authors:	 sophistication	 came	 later,	 in	 the	 “feudal	 period,”	with	 the	
development	of	Confucianism	and	Buddhism,	which	nationalists	often	used	to	denigrate	
as	“foreign”	to	the	original	“Korean	spirit.”	Kim	Myŏngsik	saw	the	nationalist	paeans	to	
“Tan’gun’s	 spirit”	 as	 a	 nonsensical	 attempt	 to	 “equate	 national	 soul	with	 barbarism.”	
Moreover,	he	ascertained	 that	 there	was	hardly	anything	specifically	 “national”	 in	 the	
supposedly	typical	traits	of	the	Korean	minjok	at	the	primitive	stage	of	its	development.	
Nationalists—typified	 by	 An	 Hwak	 in	 connection	 with	 his	 speculations	 on	 Koreans’	
“national	 character,”	 as	 mentioned	 earlier—were	 ascribing	 to	 the	 primitive	 “Korean	
nation”	 such	 qualities	 as	 optimism,	 democratic	 cooperation,	 and	 high	 religiosity.	
However,	as	Kim	Myŏngsik	saw	 it,	most	peoples	of	 the	world	demonstrated	a	broadly	
similar	 set	 of	 characteristic	 traits	 during	 their	 gradual	 transition	 from	 egalitarian	
communal	 life	 to	 the	 early	 class	 societies.	 “National	 character”	 was	 an	 artificial,	 far-
fetched	 construction,	 but	 the	 same	 could	 be	 said	 about	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 unchanging,	
eternal,	self-contained	nation	(Kim	M.	1935,	56–58).		
According	to	Kim	Myŏngsik,	the	Korean	ethno-nation	of	his	day	was	basically	a	
product	 of	 a	 long	 history	 of	 Confucian	 transformation	 of	 the	 society	 and	 cultural	
impulses	from	outside,	China	in	particular.	All	nations,	Koreans	included,	were	products	
of	 long-term	 historical	 processes	 rather	 than	 static	 entities	 preserving	 their	 “spirits”	
since	 primitive	 times.	 Both	 Japanese	 and	 Koreans	 were	 composite,	 heterogeneous	




the	 presence	 of	 Slavic	 and	 other	 heterogeneous	 elements	 in	 the	 process	 of	 German	
ethnogenesis	 but	 claimed	 that	 the	 Jews,	 Hitler’s	main	 target,	were	 no	 “pure-blooded	
nation”	 either	 (Kim	 M.	 1935,	 52–55).	 In	 short,	 Kim	 Myŏngsik	 attempted	 to	 radically	
demythologize	the	Korean	national	past,	 refusing	to	privilege	the	Korean	ethno-nation	
and	viewing	its	history	a	just	one	example	of	the	universal	process	of	nation	formation.	
For	 Kim	 Myŏngsik,	 ethnic	 Korean	 culture	 (minjok	 munhwa)	 definitely	 existed	 and	















teleologically	 leading	 to	 human—and	 national—liberation	 could	 bring.	 Talk	 of	
“homogeneous”	Koreans	and	their	“national	traits”	supposedly	nurtured	by	millennia	of	
history	 had	 weak	 foundation	 and	 led	 nowhere.	 Kim	 Kijŏn	 (1894–1948),	 a	 prominent	
nationalist	and	 ideologist	of	an	 indigenous	Korean	new	religion,	Ch’ŏndogyo,	regarded	
the	story	of	Tan’gun	and	his	supposedly	benevolent	rule	over	Korea’s	first	state,	Ancient	




the	 legitimizing	 ideology	 of	 early	 Korea’s	 nascent	 ruling	 classes	 (Paek	 S.	 2008).	 Both	
ancient	 mythology	 and	 the	 history	 of	 traditional	 Korea	 as	 a	 whole	 took	 form	 and	
developed	 according	 to	 the	 general	 laws	 of	 the	 world	 history,	 according	 to	 Hong	
Kimun’s	 summary	 of	 the	 Marxist	 historical	 method.	 The	 driving	 forces	 of	 this	
development	were	the	progress	of	society’s	productive	forces	and	the	class	struggle	of	
the	exploited,	rather	than	the	“national	spirit”	(Hong	1935;	Chŏng	2012).		
However,	 the	 nonexistence	 of	 the	 “national	 spirit”	 did	 not	 imply	 that	
Communists	 failed	 to	 recognize	 the	historical	existence	of	 the	Korean	ethno-nation	or	
were	 reluctant	 to	give	members	of	 the	ethno-nation	a	promise	of	hope	 in	 the	 future.	
Quite	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	 teleology	 of	 Marxist	 historical	 theory	 was	 essentially	 the	
teleology	of	ethnonational	liberation	in	the	eyes	of	the	colonial-era	radical	intellectuals.	
After	all,	as	Paek	Nam’un	wrote	in	a	review	of	an	article	by	a	fellow	Marxist	(and	later	a	
fellow	 member	 of	 the	 North	 Korean	 academia),	 Kim	 Kwangjin	 (1902–1986),	 on	 the	
Chosŏn	dynasty’s	 (1392–1910)	monetary	economy,	 the	only	 special	 feature	of	Korean	
history	was	the	fact	that	its	normal	capitalist	development	was	prevented	by	imperialist	
intrusions	(Paek	N.	1934a).	But	as	long	as	Korean	Communists	were	able	to	join	the	epic	
historical	 battle	 against	 both	 capitalism	 and	 its	 inevitable	 outgrowth,	 imperialism—
which,	 as	 Korean	 Communists	 asserted,	 enslaved	 three-fourths	 of	 humanity,	 Koreans	
included—their	victory	in	the	struggle	for	both	ethnonational	and	social	 liberation	was	
assured.	After	all,	 as	emphasized	 in	 the	 “Declaration	of	 the	Korean	Communist	Party”	
(first	published	in	the	Shanghai-based	Communist	journal	Pulkkot	[Flame]),	they	did	not	





definitions	 of	 everything	 related	 to	 Korean-ness—and	 the	 concept	 of	 ethno-nation	
(minjok)	was	a	focus	of	heated	ideological	contention.	After	the	concept	entered	Korea	
at	the	very	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	nationalist	interpretation	of	it	shifted	
from	 the	 precolonial	 vision	 of	 a	 nationwide	 descent	 group	 united	 in	 worshipping	 its	
titular	 patriarch,	 Tan’gun,	 to	 a	mystical	 image	 of	 a	 “national	 totality”	 as	 a	 historically	
conditioned	 homogeneous	 community	 bound	 not	 only	 by	 common	 traditions	 and	







necessarily	 imply	 a	 unitary	 descent	 line,	 and	 the	 admixture	 of	 non-Korean	 blood	 in	




interests	 into	 what	 the	 nationalists	 were	 to	 define	 as	 the	 sacred	 interests	 of	 the	
unchanging,	 age-old	 ethno-nation	 with	 its	 roots	 in	 mysterious	 antiquity.	 Given	 the	
privileged	backgrounds	and	 rather	 conservative	politics	of	 the	nationalist	 leaders,	 it	 is	
hardly	 surprising	 that	 Marxist	 critics	 regarded	 the	 nationalist	 views	 on	 the	 ethno-
nation’s	supreme	importance	as	self-interested.	
In	 addition,	 Marxists	 viewed	 their	 opponents’	 attempts	 to	 define	 the	 Korean	
ethno-nation	in	terms	of	particularity,	uniqueness,	and	unitary,	homogeneous	character	
as	dangerously	ahistorical,	implying	disinterest	toward	or	ignorance	of	the	universalities	
of	 historical	 development.	 In	 a	modern	 sense	 of	 the	word,	 nations	were	 products	 of	
capitalist	development	(although	some	Marxists	allowed	that	the	Korean	ethno-nation	
could	actually	predate	capitalism,	due	to	the	early	emergence	of	centralized	statehood	
in	premodern	Korea)	and	 the	 loci	of	all	 the	contradictions	 inherent	 to	 capitalism,	 first	
and	 foremost,	 class	 contradictions.	 Trying	 to	 demystify	 the	 absolutized	 notion	 of	 the	




were	 attempting	 to	 develop	 a	 “proto-constructivist”	 view	 of	 Korean	 ethnonational	
history	that	would	qualify	as	scientific.	Korean	minjok	and	its	history	were	to	be	seen	as	
just	 one	 case	 of	 certifying	 the	 truthfulness	 of	what	was	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 universal	




of	 the	nationalists	 indeed	 resembled	 the	nativism	of	 Japanese	 imperialist	 ideology,	 as	
the	 brilliant	 Marxist	 philosopher	 Pak	 Ch’iu	 (1909–1949)	 mentioned	 in	 an	 article	
published	just	after	the	1945	liberation	(Pak	[1946]	2010).	In	yet	another	article	written	
in	 the	 same	 year	 and	 specially	 dealing	with	 “fascization	 of	 extreme	nationalism,”	 Pak	
defined	 fascism	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 conceal	 and	 suppress	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 class	
antagonisms	by	 substituting	 “class”	with	 “nation”	 and	 to	 create	 an	 indefinite	 state	 of	
emergency	while	 relying	on	violence	and	national	 sentiments.	Many	of	 these	national	
sentiments	could	be	illogical,	or	indeed	even	pre-logical,	but	that	no	longer	mattered	in	
the	 framework	 of	 extreme	 nationalism’s	 ideology	 of	 “blood	 and	 soil.”	 In	 Pak’s	 view,	
descent	 into	a	dictatorship	based	on	 the	communality	of	nationalistic	emotions	was	a	
serious	 threat	 to	Korea’s	 future,	 as	 “backward”	 countries	generally	 tended	 to	 fall	 into	
the	trap	of	nationalistic	and	authoritarian	politics	 (reprinted	 in	Kim	Y.	2011,	332–350).	











At	 a	 time	 when	 civic	 nationalism	 is	 gradually	 replacing	 the	 ethno-nationalist	
mode	 of	 societal	 cohesion	 in	 South	 Korea,	 the	 colonial-era	 Marxist	 attempts	 to	
deconstruct	 ethno-nationalist	 notions	 are	 worth	 revisiting.	 Such	 a	 rereading	 may	
contribute	to	creating	a	post-ethno-nationalist	civic	society.	Rather	than	basking	in	the	
glory	of	 the	capitalist	successes	of	 the	 increasingly	polyethnic	South	Korean	state,	 this	
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